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The Ontological Argument and Objects of Thought
 
 Edward Wierenga
Is there anything new to be said about Anselm’s Ontological Argument? First 
formulated in the 11th century, the argument has been the subject of scrutiny 
ever since. As Alvin Plantinga has noted, “nearly every major philosopher from 
the time of Anselm to the present has had something to say about it” (1974, 85).1 
Is there really anything that this distinguished tradition has overlooked? Well, 
as Plantinga goes on to observe, “this argument has had a long and illustrious 
line of defenders extending to the present,” and as M. J. Charlesworth (1979, 
7) predicts, “so long ... as the enterprise of philosophical theology continues, 
we may expect to have the Proslogion argument still very much with us.” Perhaps, 
then, some of the more recent commentators have found issues about which 
there is room for further discussion.
 As it turns out, recent work by Gareth Matthews and by Matthews and Lynne 
Baker2 raise a number of issues deserving of further thought. In this paper, I 
propose to discuss two of them. One is a question about the context of the 
argument; the second is their more substantive proposal of a new interpretation.
I. A Prayer
 Before we look at the details of Anselm’s argument, let us briefly consider 
its context. Chapter 2 of the Proslogion begins with the words, “Therefore, Lord, 
you who grant understanding to faith, grant that, insofar as you know it is useful 
for me, I may understand that you exist as we believe you exist, and that you are 
what we believe you to be,” making it explicit that the Ontological Argument 
that follows is embedded in a prayer to God. Matthews thinks that this is one 
of the “many intriguing peculiarities” of the argument. He writes, “It is surely 
paradoxical to be addressing a being whose existence one is trying to establish. 
It is especially paradoxical to be offering the proof as part of a petitionary prayer 
to that very being” (Matthews, 2005, 82). Matthews acknowledges that there is 
“no formal contradiction in saying to someone (or as if to someone), ‘I hereby 
offer you a proof that you exist,’ or even, ‘Help me construct a proof that you 
exist’. But Matthews persists in holding that “such a procedure is extraordinarily 
odd,” and he offers a suggestion as to what exactly is wrong with this technique. 
He conjectures that this approach calls into question the “sincerity of one’s 
address to God” as well as “the genuineness of the prayer” (2005, 82). Matthews 
attempts to allay these concerns somewhat by connecting Anselm’s petition with 
Augustine’s questions whether someone could call on God without knowing 
who God is and how to direct one’s search to the right being. Matthews moves 
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from these questions to cite Augustine’s motto “faith seeking understanding” 
(fides quaerens intelluctum), which, as Matthews notes, was Anselm’s original title 
for the Proslogion, but he does not develop the allusion (2005, 83).
 But how exactly does this Augustinian precedent remove the peculiarity of 
Anselm’s prayer?  My suggestion is that developing this connection in more detail 
will enable us to see why Anselm’s project is neither peculiar nor paradoxical. A 
concern with adding understanding to faith is certainly prominent in Augustine’s 
thought, perhaps nowhere more so than in his On Free Choice of the Will. Early in 
that work Augustine affirms that “God will aid us and will make us understand 
what we believe. This is the course prescribed by the prophet who says, ‘Unless 
you believe you shall not understand’”3 (Bk I, Ch. 2). Interestingly, Augustine, like 
Anselm as we shall see below, also invokes the fool who denies God’s existence. 
He does this in a reply to his student, Evodius, who claimed to be certain by 
faith that God exists, but not by reason (Bk. II, Ch. 2). Augustine then goes on 
to develop an argument for God’s existence, which he summarizes with the claim 
that “God, that which is more excellent than reason, demonstrably exists,” and 
he concludes that “this indubitable fact we maintain, I think, not only by faith, 
but also by a sure though tenuous form of reasoning” (Bk. II, Ch. 15).4   So on 
Augustine’s view, coming to understand that God exists requires acquiring a chain 
of reasoning that is a demonstration of the proposition that God exists.5 Unlike 
Anselm, Augustine does not ask God for help in finding such a demonstration, 
but he expresses confidence that God will help him in that project. It does not 
seem that he is insincere in this hope nor in expressing his need for God’s help. 
Rather, I think, Augustine’s, and thus also Anselm’s, search for a demonstration 
of God’s existence is an expression of intense interest in God. What they both 
want to do is know more about God. Anselm’s prayer can thus be understood as 
the request that God help him understand God better, to help him know more 
about God’s nature. If his argument succeeds, what he seeks to understand about 
God’s nature is that it follows from that nature that God exists. Seeking this sort 
of understanding need not minimize the value of faith. Anselm need not think 
that this demonstration is required for belief in God, and, in any event, having 
found a demonstration he need not then base his belief in God on the argument.
II. A New Interpretation of the Argument
A. An Initial Statement of the Argument
Anselm’s argument for God’s existence, at least in his version and in those 
formulations that attempt to stay close to his, is a reductio ad absurdum.6  It begins 
by assuming that God, or that than which nothing greater can be conceived, does 
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not exist. It then proceeds to deduce a contradiction from this assumption. As 
Matthews summarizes it (approvingly), “Whatever the Fool [Anselm’s imagined 
atheist disputant] comes up with to associate with the words he mumbles in his 
heart (‘something than which nothing greater can be conceived’), when he adds 
that it—that thing he has in mind, whatever it is—is both (a) something than 
which nothing greater can be conceived, and (b) something that fails to exist in 
reality, the Fool has, Anselm can insist, contradicted himself” (2005, 97). The 
real challenge, I believe, is to find something the atheist has in mind but whose 
non-existence entails a contradiction.
 Let us look at a basic formulation of the argument so that we can see where 
some of the crucial issues lie. Let ‘B’ be a name whose reference is fixed by the 
definite description ‘the being than which a greater cannot be conceived’. Then 
assume for reductio
 (1) B does not exist.
Next, supply some general principle to capture the idea behind Anselm’s claim 
that “if [a thing] exists solely in the mind . . . , it can be thought to exist in reality 
also, which is greater.”  Perhaps,
 (2)  For all x, if x does not exist, then it conceivable that there is something 
greater than x.
(This premiss does not do justice to Anselm’s claim in Pros. 2 that it is the same 
being that could be greater, but we will ignore that detail.) Then deduce
 (3)  If B does not exist, then it conceivable that there is something greater 
than B. (from (2) by universal instantiation),
and
 (4)  It is conceivable that there is something greater than B. (From (1) and 
(3) by modus ponens).
Finally, add the premiss suggested by Anselm’s retort that “this is obviously 
impossible”, namely,
 (5) It is not conceivable that there is something greater than B.
Since (4) and (5) contradict each other, a contradiction has been deduced from 
the assumption (1); so that assumption is false.
 Many commentators have noted that the inference of (2) from (1) by universal 
instantiation is legitimate only if B is in the domain of quantification, that is, 
only if B is among the things we are talking about when we make a claim about 4
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everything. But this is precisely what the argument is designed to establish, so it 
is hardly fair to assume it in the second step of the argument.7
B. Objects of Thought
1. Talking about things without presupposing that they exist
 In their recent joint work, Baker and Matthews (2010) offer a novel and 
sophisticated proposal designed to ensure that the defender of the argument and 
the objector have a neutral way to frame the question. Their idea is to introduce 
the category of “objects of thought”,8 which are things we think or talk about, 
whether they exist in reality or not. A benefit of this approach is that that than 
which nothing greater can be conceived exists at least in thought, as an object of 
thought, and is available therefore to be talked about.9 It should thus be possible 
to avoid the problem identified at the end of the last section, namely, that of 
presupposing the existence in reality of this being in order to reason from the 
assumption that it does not exist to the conclusion that it would be greater if it 
did. Seeing how the appeal to objects of thought avoids this objection requires 
some exegesis, however.
 Baker and Matthews say that objects of thought are “people, places, and 
things that we talk about, think about, and refer to, even when we wonder 
whether they exist or not” (34). Except for the final clause, objects of thought 
might just be ordinary people and things. However, Baker and Matthews add 
that they also include “mythical beings, fictional characters, hallucinated people, 
and things thought to exist on the basis of false belief or false testimony” (36, n. 
11). According to Baker and Matthews, “it is an empirical fact that we human 
beings have the ability to think of, speak of, and refer to things whether they 
exist in reality or not, and even whether the thinker or speaker believes that they 
exist or not” (34–35).10 They give as examples the Loch Ness Monster, Johnny 
Appleseed,11 and Lady Macbeth.
 An important motivation for Baker and Matthews is the idea that people 
can successfully communicate with each other without sharing a commitment to 
the real existence of the things they are talking about. Both believers and skeptics 
can discuss reported sightings of the Loch Ness Monster, for example, and they 
can discuss its probable dimensions or the depths at which it is most likely to 
live. More generally, philosophers can argue about the existence of objects of a 
certain kind and yet understand each other. Sociologists can report the beliefs 
of their subjects without denying them. In all of these cases, people are able to 
think and talk about things without assuming that they exist—all they need is 
agreement “on a definite description to pick out the object of thought whose 
existence in reality is in dispute” (37).
5
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2. Two ways of having a property
 In addition to things existing in reality or merely in thought, there are, according 
to Baker and Matthews, two corresponding ways for an object of thought to have 
a property, namely, had-in-reality and had-in-thought. Having a property in reality is 
just the familiar way of having a property. Having a property in thought is being 
thought about in a certain way, or being thought of as having that property. 
Pegasus, for example, has many of his salient properties in thought only. He 
does not have-in-reality the property of being a horse. But he does have some 
properties in reality, for example, being the subject of many paintings. Having 
some properties in thought and others in reality is not, however, a defining feature 
of objects of thought that exist only in thought. For you and I and other really 
existing things have properties in both ways. We have them in reality if we really 
have them, and we have them in thought if people think of us as having them.
3. Incomplete sets of properties
 Thus, the distinction between objects that exist in reality and objects that exist 
only in thought is not to be made on the basis of how they have their properties. 
Rather, objects that exist in thought only have (in thought) an incomplete set of 
properties.12 They have only the properties that they have been thought to have. 
Thus, to cite Baker’s and Matthews’ examples, there is no correct answer to 
the question of how much Pegasus weighs or on what day of the week Sherlock 
Holmes was born. Things that exist in reality, on the other hand, have (in reality) 
a complete set of properties. For any property, an object that exists in reality either 
has that property or it has the complement of that property.13
4. Collaborative construction
 It would be nice to know a little more about those objects of thought that do 
not exist in reality. Baker and Matthews are careful to distinguish their view from 
Meinongianism.14 They claim that, in contrast to recent Meinongian proposals, 
their special objects do not make up their own ontological category, are not 
automatically generated by any comprehension principle,15 and depend upon 
the human ability to talk about things, whether or not they exist. On this last 
point, Baker and Matthews are surely right: their view is motivated by and rooted 
in the phenomenon of people talking about things without regard to whether 
they exist. But their view certainly seems to have an ontological commitment: 
there are (in thought) people and things that do not exist (in reality). The case of 
fictional characters is illustrative. As Arthur Conan Doyle wrote more Sherlock 
6
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Holmes stories, Holmes acquired-in-thought additional properties. Perhaps when 
Nicholas Meyer wrote further Holmes stories, Holmes acquired-in-thought still 
more properties. If fans of Holmes come to believe that he said, “Elementary, 
my dear Watson,” even though he never utters that phrase in a Conan Doyle 
work, then Holmes has-in-thought the property of having said that. Formulating 
a detailed principle here, however, would be a formidable task. One can see why 
Baker and Matthews did not attempt it. On the one hand, one might think that 
there should be some limits on under what circumstances someone could add 
had-in-thought properties to a mere object of thought. It should be possible, 
for example, for someone to be mistaken about what properties a mere object 
of thought has in thought. But this could not happen if anyone who thinks of 
a thing as having a property succeeds in adding that property to the ones the 
object has in thought. On the other hand, if there are limits, they are presumably 
generous, since Baker and Matthews recognize that objects of thought can have-
in-thought incompatible properties, as apparently happened when Conan Doyle 
gave different, incompatible locations for Dr. Watson’s war wounds.
 Baker and Matthews thus endorse a collaborative “construction” of objects 
of thought. They take postmodernism a step further by providing for the social 
construction of unreality. This approach has an interesting application to the 
ontological argument. In his earlier paper (2005), Matthews suggests that western 
religious practice provides evidence that God exists, at least in the understanding:
 One could argue that the history of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam 
provides evidence for supposing that there is a common object of worship 
in these traditions, a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. 
If we can provide evidence that there is indeed such a common object 
of worship, across various languages, and within different cultures, then 
we have good reason to say that God, not just as a formula or an idea, 
but as an object of worship, exists at least in the understanding. Having 
secured this referential peg, we could then follow Anselm’s argument ... 
and prove, it seems, that God does not exist merely in the understanding, 
but in reality as well.16
5. Reference to objects of thought
 After making one more introductory point about what objects of thought 
are supposed to be like, we will be able to turn at last to see how the idea can 
be applied to the ontological argument. According to Baker and Matthews, our 
terms refer to objects of thought; indeed, we can make de re predications about 
objects of thoughts (2010, 47). But exactly whom or what we refer to depends 
upon whether the object of thought exists only in the understanding or whether 
it exists in reality. If it exists in reality, our terms refer to the actual individual 
7
Wierenga: The Ontological Argument and Objects of Thought
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 2011
89   Edward Wierenga
or thing. If there is a giant creature living in the depths of Loch Ness, the term 
‘the Loch Ness Monster’ refers to it; if not, the term refers to a mere object of 
thought, an object corresponding to a certain incomplete set of properties.
 This feature of reference to objects of thought holds for reference to the 
being than which nothing greater can be thought, as well. Baker and Matthews 
say that 
 In order to disagree, Anselm and the Fool (the atheist) must refer to 
the same thing (whether or not it exists in reality). That than which nothing 
greater can be conceived is in both the Fool’s and Anselm’s understanding 
by dint of the Fool’s and Anselm’s talking about and referring to that 
than which nothing greater can be conceived. If Anselm is right, then 
the Fool is unwittingly referring to something that exists in reality; if the 
Fool is right, then Anselm is unwittingly referring to something that exists 
only in the understanding, and not in reality. (2010, 45)
This idea that the reference of our terms is to the actual object, if there is one, 
and to a mere object of thought otherwise, will turn out to be important below.17 
C. Greatness and Objects of Thought
 We are finally in a position to return to the ontological argument. In order 
to give an account of comparative greatness that applies to objects that do not 
exist in reality, Baker and Matthews introduce a technical relation of being an 
otherwise exact same thing as:
(OES)  If x exists merely in thought, then any y that exists in thought and 
in reality and has-in-reality all the properties that x has-in-thought, 
is an otherwise exact same thing as x. (2010, 46)
Recall that a thing that exists only in thought is “incomplete”, that is, it has-in-
thought a limited number of properties. Pegasus, for example, has-in-thought 
such properties as being a horse, having wings, having been ridden by Bellerophon, 
etc.18 Anything that exists in reality and has-in-reality all of these properties is an 
otherwise exact same thing as Pegasus. 
 Baker and Matthews use this concept of being an otherwise exact same thing as 
in order to state a principle about greatness:
(G)  For anything x that existed only in thought, an otherwise [exact] same 
thing that existed both in thought and in reality would be greater 
8
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(not just greater in thought) than x.
If there were a real horse that had wings and had-in-reality the other properties 
that Pegasus has-in thought, then the real horse would be greater than Pegasus 
(is, in fact).
 Baker and Matthews have a fairly elaborate way of defending (G). They note 
that Pegasus has-in-thought various causal powers, for example, powers of flight. But 
they hold that these are all mediated causal powers, by which they mean that Pegasus 
has these powers in virtue of people thinking him to have them. They are not 
unmediated causal powers, which a real horse could have on its own, independently 
of what anyone (save God, perhaps) thought.19 Baker and Matthews claim that 
“(G) is vindicated by the fact that something’s having-in-reality unmediated causal 
powers is greater than an otherwise same thing’s having in reality only mediated 
causal powers that depend on the thoughts of people who exist in reality” (2010, 
47). This seems not to be stated quite correctly. Being an otherwise exact same thing 
as is not a symmetrical relation. It is defined to be a relation between a non-actual 
object of thought and a real object of thought, where the latter has-in-reality all 
of the properties the former has-in-thought. So there cannot be a thing that has 
an otherwise exact same thing with only mediated powers. If y is an otherwise 
exact same thing as x, then y exists in reality and does not have its properties 
only in virtue of the thoughts of others. Baker’s and Matthew’s point can easily 
be restated, however. It is the claim that if y is an otherwise exact same thing as 
x, then y’s causal powers do not depend on what people think about it, whereas 
x’s causal powers do depend on thoughts; and, therefore y is greater than x.20 
Having one’s causal powers in a way that is not dependent upon being thought 
(by people) to have them makes a thing greater than a thing whose powers are 
had only in thought. Putting the claim this way, however, suggests that the focus 
on causal powers is unnecessary. Having any property in reality is enough to make 
a thing greater than a thing that has its properties only derivatively—or, putting 
the point more cautiously, if a thing has its properties in thought, then anything 
that has all of those properties in reality is greater. If an object of thought has-in-
thought such properties as omnipotence, omniscience, aseity, etc., then a thing that 
exists in reality and has these same properties in reality is greater. There does not 
seem to be anything special or unique in this regard about causal properties.
D. Return to the Argument
 Let us see how all of this bears on the ontological argument. Recall the simple 
version of the argument I stated at the outset: As before, fix the reference of ‘B’ 
by means of the description ‘the being than which a greater cannot be conceived’.
9
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 (1)  B does not exist. (assumption for reductio)
 (2)   For all x, if x does not exist, then it conceivable that there is something 
greater than x. (premiss)
∴ (3)   If B does not exist, then it conceivable that there is something greater 
than B. (2), universal instantiation
∴ (4)   It is conceivable that there is something greater than B. (1), (3), modus ponens
 (5)  It is not conceivable that there is something greater than B. (premiss)
∴ (6)  B exists. (1)-(5), reductio ad absurdum
As we saw, a standard objection to the argument in this form is that the inference 
from (2) to (3) assumes that that than which nothing greater can be conceived 
already exists. A claim that holds of everything holds of everything that exists, but 
there is no guarantee that it holds of non-existent things (if there are any). For 
example, it seems true that every horse is at a particular spatio-temporal distance 
from here now. It is therefore perfectly legitimate to deduce that Zenyatta is at 
a particular spatio-temporal distance from here now or to deduce that Rachel 
Alexander is at a particular spatio-temporal distance from here now. But it would 
be a mistake to deduce that Pegasus is at a particular spatio-temporal distance 
from here now, even if you think that there are other truths about Pegasus.21
 By appealing to objects of thought and drawing on their principles (OES) 
and (G), Baker and Matthews can provide an alternate argument for line (4), one 
that does not require universal instantiation onto an object whose existence is 
in question.22 They could rewrite the initial steps of the argument as follows:
 (1’)  B does not exist in reality. (assumption for reductio)
 (2’)   If B does not exist in reality, then if it is possible for something to have in 
reality all of the properties that B has in thought, then it is conceivable 
that there is something greater than B. (OES), (B)
 (3’)   It is possible that something has in reality all of the properties that B 
has in thought. (premiss)
∴ (4)   It is conceivable that there is something greater than B. (1), (3), modus ponens
On the assumption (1’) that B does not exist, Baker’s and Matthews’ account has 
it that ‘B’ refers to a certain mere object of thought, an object of thought that 
has-in-thought the property being that than which nothing greater can be conceived. 
According to their principles (OES) and (G), if it is possible for something to 
have that property (and any others that B has-in-thought) in reality, then it is 
10
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possible for there to be an otherwise exact same thing as B and, thus, possible 
for something to be greater than B.
 A complication arises, however, if we think that the argument could easily 
be adapted to apply to God instead of B. We would begin by supposing that God 
is an object of thought that does not exist in reality, and we could add then that 
God has-in-thought a set of impressive properties, being omnipotent, being omniscient, 
being that than which nothing greater can be conceived, etc. So if it is conceivable for 
something that also exists in reality to have-in-reality all of these properties, by 
(OES) such a thing would be an otherwise exact same thing as God, and by (G) 
it would be greater than God. So, on the assumptions that God does not exist 
in reality and that it is conceivable that there be something that is an otherwise 
exact same thing as God, it follows that it is conceivable that there is something 
greater than God, which is what the fourth line of the argument would say.
 If, however, God is the object of thought that Jews, Christians, and Muslims 
all worship, then a problem looms. As we saw, Baker and Matthews endorse 
the claim that “if we can provide evidence that there is indeed such a common 
object of worship, across various languages, and within different cultures, then 
we have good reason to say that God, not just as a formula or an idea, but as an 
object of worship, exists at least in the understanding” (2010, 44). If this is the 
object of thought that is the subject of Anselm’s argument and it does not exist 
in reality, then it will have-in-thought many extraordinary attributes, but some 
of them will be incompatible with others. The social way in which mere objects 
of thought acquire their properties-in-thought is by people thinking of them in 
those ways. So Christians will think of God as triune, and Jews and Muslims 
will think of God as not triune. Thus, if God does not exist in reality, the set of 
properties he has-in-thought will include both being triune and not being triune. In 
that case, it would not be possible that there be something that is an otherwise 
exact same thing as God, because such a thing would have to have-in-reality a 
set of logically incompatible properties.23 So if God is the object of thought the 
western theistic religions worship in common, Baker’s and Matthew’s account 
seems insufficient to establish premiss (4) (with ‘God’ replacing ‘B’).
 There is, of course, an easy way around this problem. It is to restrict the object 
of thought under dispute simply to what Anselm and his atheist opponent explicitly 
mention, namely, that than which nothing greater can be conceived. The set of 
properties an otherwise exact same thing as that than which nothing greater can 
be conceived, if the latter did not exist, would have to have in reality would simply 
be the set containing being such that nothing greater can be conceived and whatever 
other properties are entailed by that one. If Anselm is right that “God is whatever 
it is better to be than not” (Pros. 4) and that it is better to be the maker of all other 
beings, to be happy, just, omnipotent, merciful, etc. (Pros. 5–6), then it would still 
be a substantial achievement to demonstrate that such a being exists.24
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 So it seems that Baker and Matthews can provide an alternative argument in 
support of premiss (4). On the assumption that that than which nothing greater 
can be conceived does not exist, our terms for that object of thought, namely, ‘B’ 
or ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’ refer to a certain object of 
thought that exists in thought only and has its salient properties in thought only. 
If it is conceivable that some really existing thing have those properties in reality, 
then, by principle (G), it is conceivable that there be something greater that the 
thing to which ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’ refers. So, it 
is conceivable that there is something greater than B, which is what (4) says.
 Now, however, it is considerably less clear that Baker and Matthew provide 
us with a reason to accept
 (5)  It is not conceivable that there is something greater than B.
Recall that according to Baker and Matthews, ‘B’ refers to an object of thought. 
Thus (5) should be understood de re25 as
 (5*)  B is such that it is not conceivable that there is something greater than it.
But the assumption that ‘B’ is referential leads to a serious difficulty. If the being 
than which nothing greater can be conceived really exists, for example, if God 
exists, then ‘B’ refers to it. In that case (5*) expresses
 (5*R)  God is such that it is not conceivable that there be a being greater than it.
On the other hand, if the being than which nothing greater can be conceived 
does not exist in reality, if it is a mere object of thought, a fictional entity that 
can be modeled by an incomplete set of properties, then ‘B’ refers to that mere 
object of thought. In this case we can understand (5*) as
 (5*U)   The mere object of thought that has-in-thought the property of being such 
nothing greater can be conceived is such that it is not conceivable that 
there is something greater than it.
Now (5*R) is eminently plausible. The same cannot be said for (5*U), however. 
Indeed, according to Baker’s and Matthews’ account, (5*U) is false, as we have just 
seen in tracing their argument for (4). If the being than which it is not conceivable 
that there be a greater is a mere object of thought, then, it is conceivable that 
there is something greater than it, provided that it is conceivable that something 
have-in-reality all of the properties that object of thought has-in-thought.
 So (5*) either expresses the true proposition (5*R), or it expresses the false 
12
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proposition (5*U). Which one that is, the truth or the falsehood, depends upon 
whether the being than which it is not conceivable that there be a greater exists 
in reality. If we do not assume that God exists, or that ‘B’ refers to an object that 
exists in reality, we cannot say whether (5*) expresses a truth or a falsehood.
 My conclusion is that starting from the assumption that Anselm and his 
atheist opponent both refer, neutrally, to an object of thought, whether or not 
that object of thought exists, leaves it equally open whether a crucial premiss 
of the argument is true. The atheist, believing that the phrase ‘the being than 
which nothing greater can be conceived’ refers to a non-actual object of thought, 
has no reason to agree that it is not conceivable that any being be greater than 
it, and, in fact, Baker and Matthews provide a reason for the atheist to support 
that position. I am thus not persuaded of Baker’s and Matthew’s claim that “the 
argument appears to be sound, and the existence of God is proved” (2010, 50).26
   University of Rochester
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Appendix
Baker’s and Matthew’s (2010, 47–49) Version of the Ontological Argument
Stage 1
 a.  The theist and the atheist refer to the same object with the words, “that 
than which nothing greater can be conceived.”
Therefore,
 b.  That than which nothing greater can be conceived is an object that 
exists in both the theist’s and the atheist’s understanding (by (a) and 
the meaning of “existing in the understanding”).
Let S be the object that exists in the theist’s and atheist’s understanding and that 
is such that nothing greater can be conceived. So,
 c.  S is the object that exists in the theist’s and atheist’s understanding and 
that is such that nothing greater can be conceived ((b) and stipulation 
of “S”).
Therefore,
 d.  S exists in thought ((c) and stipulation “exists in the understanding” = 
“exists in thought”).
Stage 2
 1.  S exists in thought and S does not exist in reality (premiss for reductio ad 
absurdum).
 2.  An otherwise exact same thing as S that existed both in thought and in 
reality is conceivable (premiss).
[Therefore,]
 3.  If S exists in thought and not in reality and an otherwise exact same 
thing as S that existed both in thought and in reality is conceivable, then 
an otherwise exact same thing as S that existed both in thought and in 
reality would be greater than S (by (1) and Principle (G)).
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[Therefore,]
 4.  An otherwise exact same thing as S that existed both in thought and in 
reality would be greater than S ((1), (2) conjunction, (3) modus ponens).
[Therefore (?)]
 5.  If an otherwise exact same thing as S that existed both in thought and 
in reality and is conceivable would be greater than S, then there can be 
a conceivable object that is greater than S (namely, an otherwise exact 
same thing as S that also existed in reality). [(2), (4) and a principle of 
transfer of conceivability?].
Therefore,
 6.  There can be a conceivable object that is greater than S ((4), (5), modus 
ponens).
 7.  There can be no conceivable object that is greater than S (line (c) above) 
[premiss].
[Therefore,]
 8.  There can be a conceivable object that is greater than S, and there can 
be no conceivable object that is greater than S ((6), (7), conjunction).
Therefore,
 9.  It is not the case that: S exists in thought and S does not exist in reality 
((1)-(8), reductio ad absurdum).
 10.  S does exist in reality ((9), DeMorgan’s rule, line (d), disjunctive syllogism).
Comments:
 a.  I have replaced brackets in the original with parentheses so that I could 
use brackets to indicate my own insertions.
 b.  Baker and Matthews make it clear that “can be a conceivable object” 
means “it is metaphysically possible that there is a conceivable object” 
(n. 46), and I suppose that a conceivable object is something that is or 
could be an object of thought.
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 c.  My claim in the paper is that Baker’s and Matthew’s account provides 
a justification for (6), at least if one is willing to countenance objects of 
thoughts that do not exist in reality, but it leaves (7) in doubt.
 d.  The reason that (7) is dubious is that it is ambiguous. If ‘S’ refers merely 
to a non-actual object of thought that has-in-thought the property of 
being that than which nothing greater can be conceived, then the proposition 
expressed by (7) is false. If ‘S’ refers to a being who exists in reality and 
has-in-reality the property of being that than which nothing greater can be 
thought, then the proposition expressed by (7) is true. As long as the 
theist and the atheist agree merely that ‘S’ refers to some object of 
thought—leaving it open whether that is a mere object of thought or a 
really existing being who really has properties—it remains open whether 
(7) expresses a truth. To claim that it is true is to claim something that 
presupposes that that than which nothing greater can be conceived exists 
in reality and has this impressive property in reality, which is what the 
argument is supposed to demonstrate.
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Notes
1  See Charlesworth (1979, 3–7) for a description of the argument’s 
comparative neglect in the 12th century and a capsule summary of its 
treatment by philosophers from the 13th through 18th centuries.
2  Matthews (2005), Matthews and Baker (2010), Baker and Matthews (2010), 
Matthews and Baker (2011).
3  Isaiah 7:9, in the Septuagint.
4  Augustine’s actual argument is not as compelling or as interesting as 
Anselm’s. Here is his summary: “You granted, moreover, that if I showed 
you something higher than our minds, you would admit, assuming that 
nothing existed which was still higher, that God exists. I accepted your 
condition and said that it was enough to show this. For if there is something 
more excellent than truth, this is God. If there is not, then truth itself is 
God. Whether or not truth is God, you cannot deny that God exists, and 
this was the question with which we agreed to deal” (Bk. II Ch. 15).
5  Compare Augustine’s tripartite division of objects of belief in Eighty-three 
Different Questions. There are propositions that are believed but never 
understood, for example, beliefs about history. There are beliefs that 
are understood as soon as they are believed, for example, propositions 
of mathematics. And there are things which are first believed then 
later understood, for example, propositions about divine things. That 
propositions about mathematics are understood as soon as they are believed 
suggests that understanding in this case involves seeing that a proposition 
is self-evidently true or that it is a priori. The reason propositions about 
the past are never understood is perhaps due to the fact that there can 
never be a demonstration of them from propositions of the kind that are 
self-evident. But that propositions about divine matters can be understood 
after being believed is perhaps because, as Augustine thinks, there can be a 
(tenuous) form of reasoning leading to them from propositions that are self-
evidently true. Augustine makes a further intriguing claim in this passage 
which I am not able to explain, however. It is that the divine matters can 
only be understood by “those who are pure in heart” (Q. 48).
6  Despite the many similarities between Augustine and Anselm, arguing for 
God’s existence by way of a reductio seems not to have occurred to Augustine.
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7  Cf. Graham Oppy’s diagnosis of what is wrong with ontological arguments: 
“In any version of one of the historical arguments, it will be the case that 
the singular terms and quantifiers—names, definite descriptions, indefinite 
descriptions, and so forth—used in the statement of the argument—to refer 
to, or denote, or to range over a collection that is supposed to include, that 
divine object whose existence is to be established by the argument—either 
occur embedded in the scope of further sentential operators, or they do 
not occur thus embedded. It they do not occur thus embedded, then an 
opponent of the argument can reasonably object that the question has been 
begged” (1995, 115).
8  In the earlier (Baker, 2009), the term was “thought-objects”.
9  In (2009) Baker says explicitly that “thought-objects ... are in the ontology 
and subject to quantification” (mss. p. 2).
10  It is an empirical fact that we can successfully communicate with each other 
using names or definite descriptions that, as I would put it, do not refer. 
It is less clear that we have evidence for the claim that such terms refer to a 
special class of objects.
11  John Chapman, 1774–1845. I assume that he is on the list because some 
people talk about him while assuming that he was (merely) a legend.
12  I think that another way Baker and Matthews might distinguish mere 
objects of thought from actually existing objects of thought is that mere 
objects of thought have all of their had-in-thought properties essentially. 
Pegasus couldn’t have failed to have been captured by Bellerophon (in 
thought), although it could have failed to have been depicted in such-and 
such painting (in reality).
13  As Baker and Matthews note, this claim ignores possible complications due 
to vagueness. What they actually say, however, is “... for any given property, 
an object that exists in reality either has-in-reality that property or it fails 
to have-it-in-reality” (39). This way of putting the point does not mark a 
distinction between mere objects of thought and really existing objects of 
thought, for both satisfy this condition. It would not help to say that mere 
objects of thought are such that for any property they either have-in-thought 
that property or they fail to have it in thought, for presumably they fail to 
have in thought all of the properties no one has thought them to have. 
But mere objects of thought do not satisfy this condition: for any property, 
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they either have-in-thought that property or they have-in-thought the 
complement of that property. Sherlock Holmes neither has-in-thought the 
property of weighing ten stone nor does he have-in-thought the property of 
not weighing ten stone.
14  The Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong (1853–1920) is the father of 
Meinongianism. Baker and Matthews cite Parsons (1980) and Zalta (1983) 
as contemporary Meinongians. The leading idea is that there are, in some 
sense, non-existent objects.
15  Some Meinongian theories have principles that say under what conditions 
a non-actual object exists. For example, in (Parsons, 1980) for any set of 
“nuclear” properties, such as, being blue, being a mountain, etc., some object 
has all the properties in the set and no more.
16  (2005, 94–95). Baker and Matthews allude to this passage in support of 
their claim that God is an object of thought, whether he exists in reality or 
not (2010, 44).
17  An interesting alternative treatment of the argument is given by Wolterstorff 
(1993). He holds, in effect, that for Anselm and the Fool to disagree they 
must mean the same thing (rather than refer to the same thing), and he 
interprets Gaunilo as denying that we can refer to God if God does not 
exist.
18  It is tempting to identify a non-actual thing with the set of properties it has-
in-thought. On this suggestion, Pegasus just is the set {being a horse, having 
wings, having been ridden by Bellerophon, etc.}. This makes it easy to agree 
with Baker and Matthews that Pegasus exists—it just isn’t really a winged 
horse. But Baker and Matthews would resist this suggestion. They write, 
“An object of thought, however, is not a representation of an object thought 
about or referred to, let alone a concept of such an object; rather, it is the 
very person or thing thought about or referred to, whether it exists in reality 
or not” (210, 36). Perhaps, however, we may represent unreal objects of 
thoughts in this way.
19  In both (Matthews and Baker, 2010) and (Matthews and Baker, 2011) 
the distinction between mediated and unmediated causal powers figures 
prominently, along with an emphasis on the value of the latter. I insert the 
qualifier ‘independently of God’ in case everything except for God depends 
on his thoughts.
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20  An additional complication I shall not pursue here: (G) specifies a 
counterfactual condition. It does not require that a non-actual thing really 
have an otherwise exact same thing. Rather, it says that if for a non-actual 
thing x there were a thing y that is an otherwise exact same thing as x, y 
would be greater than x. Even this formulation leaves out some details, for 
presumably the various greatnesses here should be relativized to worlds. We 
could try 
 (G*)  For any thing x and world W, if x is an object of thought in 
W but does not exist in reality in W, then for any thing y and 
world W’, if y exists in W’ and has-in-reality in W’ all of the 
properties that x has-in-thought in W, then the greatness of y 
in W’ exceeds the greatness of x in W.
  This formulation secures the intended result, namely, if a thing doesn’t 
really exist but something could have-in-reality all of its properties, then 
it is possible that something is greater than it. It should be noted that (G) 
and (G*) specify a sufficient condition for an object of thought to have 
(or possibly to have) something be greater than it, but it is not completely 
general. For example, it licenses the claim that something could be greater 
than Sherlock Holmes, because there could be an actual thing that had in 
reality all of Holmes’ had-in-thought properties, and such a thing would 
be greater than Holmes. But (G) does not justify the claim that something 
could be greater than Dr. Watson, because we know that nothing could have 
in reality all of Watson’s had-in-thought properties (those incompatible 
war wounds). This limitation will not prevent (G) from being used in the 
Ontological Argument, however, provided that it is possible for something 
to have in reality all of the properties that the greatest conceivable being has 
in thought.
21  On Baker’s and Matthews’ account, as we have seen, mere objects of 
thought are “incomplete”. Let us suppose that properties specifying Pegasus’ 
location are among the ones that are missing.
22  I will discuss Baker’s and Matthew’s view as it applies to the simple argument 
in the text, but their full argument is given in the appendix, for anyone who 
wants to verify that what I say applies to the argument they actually give.
23  This point does not depend upon the ecumenical proposal that Jews, 
Christians, and Muslims worship the same God. Even different believers 
within a single tradition will attribute incompatible attributes to God, for 
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example, Christians who disagree about whether God is eternal or not 
eternal but everlasting instead.
24  It would leave open the question of the relation between that than which 
nothing greater can be conceived and the God of Abraham, Isaac, and 
Jacob. For a discussion of some of these issues, see my (2011). There is 
another, possibly more serious, issue that arises from switching from an 
object of thought that arises in established and pervasive religious practice 
to the limited, minimal one that emerges from the artificial debate between 
Anselm and his opponent. It is that two people could introduce for 
discussion an arbitrary additional attribute compatible with being that than 
which nothing greater can be conceived. For example, Anselm could try to 
persuade the Fool of the existence the being who is that than which nothing 
greater can be conceived and who guarantees that the Chicago Cubs win 
the 2013 World Series. If the argument using the minimal property of being 
that than which nothing greater can be conceived is a sound proof, an arbitrarily 
expanded property should also yield a sound proof. One might try to object 
that ensuring that the Cubs win the Series does not contribute to a being’s 
greatness, and perhaps that is right. But according to Baker’s and Matthews’ 
principle (G), if the object of thought who has-in-thought the properties of 
being that than which nothing greater can be conceived and ensuring that the Cubs 
win the 2013 Series does not exist, then a thing existing in reality who has-in-
reality both of those properties is indeed greater. Worse, Anselm could also 
give a second argument for the existence of a being who is that than which 
nothing greater can be conceived and who prevents the Chicago Cubs from 
winning the 2013 World Series. There seems to no obstacle to using two 
arguments to prove the existence of two beings who could not possibly both 
exist.
25  My claim in the text is that Baker’s and Matthew’s referential interpretation 
of ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’ requires them to 
interpret (5) as de re. A second reason is that (5) must be interpreted in this 
way if it is to contradict (4). The argument that Baker and Matthews give for 
(4), that it is conceivable that there be a being greater than the being than 
which it is not conceivable that there be a greater (on the assumption that 
the latter does not exist in reality), is an argument for the de re interpretation 
of (4). Under the assumption that that than which nothing greater can 
be conceived exists only in the understanding, principle (G) licenses the 
conclusion (given that it is conceivable that something existing in reality 
has all of the former being’s properties) that it is conceivable that there is 
something that is greater than that being, which is a de re reading.
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26  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2012 Central Division 
meetings of the American Philosophical Association in a session in memory 
of Gareth B. Matthews. I am grateful to Georges Dicker for the invitation to 
present the present version under the auspices of the Center for Philosophic 
Exchange at The College at Brockport, State University of New York. 
Thanks are due to members of the audiences on both occasions as well as, 
especially, to Lynne Baker, Andrew Chignell, Earl Conee, Georges Dicker, 
and Graham Oppy for helpful discussion and suggestions.
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